Atty. Jasmine Nicole Abella

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Grateful for this new responsibility. ⚖️I am humbled and grateful to have been commissioned as a Notary Public for Quezo...
14/09/2026

Grateful for this new responsibility. ⚖️
I am humbled and grateful to have been commissioned as a Notary Public for Quezon City for the 2026–2027 term.

I look forward to carrying out this responsibility with integrity, impartiality, and fidelity to the Rules on Notarial Practice.

Atty. Jasmine Nicole B. Abella
Notary Public – Quezon City

06/09/2026

Day 1 has ended. Read the questions in Political and Public International Law and in Commercial and Taxation Laws on the Supreme Court website.

Political and Public International Law (Morning Exams):https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-BAR-Political-and-Public-International-Law-Law.pdf

Commercial and Taxation Laws (Afternoon Exams):https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2026-BAR-Commercial-and-Taxation-Laws.pdf




04/09/2026

The (SC) has ruled that evidence of credit card hacking cannot be seized under a search warrant that authorizes only the search for illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia unless they are discovered in plain view.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division acquitted an accused of violating Republic Act No. (RA) 8484, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1998. Section 9(e) of the law prohibits the possession of counterfeit access devices, including fake credit cards.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received information that the accused was involved in illegal drug activities and computer hacking, particularly credit card fraud.

To verify the report, the NBI instructed the informant to buy methamphetamine hydrochloride (𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶) from the accused. Laboratory test later confirmed that it was indeed 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The NBI obtained a search warrant for violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, authorizing the search for 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 and other drug-related items.

During the search of the accused’s residence, NBI agents seized several items including computers, ATM cards, laptops, a money counter, a dry seal, and a card-scheming device.

They also recovered two American Express credit cards bearing the name “V S Tan.” An American Express manager later confirmed that the cards were fake because their numbers did not match the records of the original account holder.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused based on the evidence seized in the implementation of the search warrant.

The SC reversed the conviction and explained that, as a general rule, authorities may seize only items specifically described in a search warrant. One exception is the plain view doctrine, which allows officers to seize evidence they discover while lawfully present in a place.

For the 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦 to apply, the officers must have a lawful reason to be in the place where the evidence is found; the discovery must be inadvertent or unintentional; and it must be immediately clear that the item may be connected to a crime.

The SC found that only the first requirement was met.

The search warrant covered only illegal drugs and related paraphernalia. It did not authorize the seizure of credit cards or other access devices.

Their discovery of the credit cards was also not made in plain view. The credit cards were inside a non-transparent bag. Their contents could not be seen until the bag was opened. Even then, the cards did not appear fake on their face. Their alleged connection to a crime became apparent only because of the NBI’s prior information and their subsequent verification by American Express.

Although the NBI agents were lawfully inside the accused’s residence, their discovery of the credit cards was not accidental. The agents already had information linking the accused to alleged credit card fraud and hacking but did not obtain a search warrant covering those offenses.

The SC thus ruled that the credit cards were unlawfully seized and could not be used as evidence against the accused. Without them, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt under RA 8484.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172645

Read the full text of the Decision athttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/273931.pdf

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

CASE DIGEST | SUPREME COURT BANK CANNOT PASS THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS OWN GROSS NEGLIGENCE TO A DEPOSITORBDO Unibank, Inc...
27/08/2026

CASE DIGEST | SUPREME COURT

BANK CANNOT PASS THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS OWN GROSS NEGLIGENCE TO A DEPOSITOR

BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Cristina Barcellano y Riego
G.R. No. 261264 | February 16, 2026 | Third Division
Ponente: Justice Japar B. Dimaampao

DOCTRINE:
A bank cannot require a depositor to return money already withdrawn on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.
Banks are engaged in a business imbued with public interest and are therefore required to exercise extraordinary diligence in handling banking transactions.

FACTS:
Cristina Barcellano deposited a ₱151,200.00 regional Landbank check into her BDO savings account.
However, a BDO teller mistakenly processed the check as a local check instead of a regional check, causing it to clear within three (3) banking days instead of seven (7) days.
Because the funds were prematurely made available, Barcellano was able to withdraw ₱76,000.00.

The following day, the check was returned to BDO because of a stop-payment order. BDO demanded that Barcellano return the ₱76,000.00 and eventually filed an estafa case against her.
The RTC acquitted Barcellano. The CA affirmed.
BDO then went to the Supreme Court, arguing that Barcellano should return the money because allowing her to retain it would constitute unjust enrichment and that the amount should be returned under the principle of solutio indebiti.

ISSUE:
Can BDO compel Barcellano to return the ₱76,000.00 on the ground of unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti?

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court found that BDO committed multiple errors:
First, BDO credited the amount of the check without properly clearing it with the drawee bank.

Second, its teller improperly processed a regional check as a local check.

Third, BDO failed to detect the erroneous clearing and discovered the problem only after receiving the stop-payment order.

Taken together, these errors constituted GROSS NEGLIGENCE on the part of the bank.

The Court emphasized:
“It is axiomatic that no recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence.”

The Supreme Court also found that BDO failed to establish that Barcellano knowingly received a benefit to which she was not entitled.

The reason for the stop-payment order was not established, and there was no showing that Barcellano knew that the check would not be honored. Her actions instead supported the inference that she believed in good faith that the funds credited to her account belonged to her.

Thus, solutio indebiti did not apply.

WHY IS THIS CASE IMPORTANT?
The case emphasizes that a bank cannot simply invoke unjust enrichment to recover money when the loss resulted from the bank's own gross negligence.

Banks are required to exercise extraordinary diligence because their business is imbued with public interest.

Before a check is cleared, the collecting bank assumes at its own risk that the check will eventually be cleared and paid.

Thus, when a bank prematurely makes funds available because it failed to follow proper banking safeguards, it cannot simply shift the consequences of its own gross negligence to an innocent depositor who withdrew the funds in good faith.

Full Text of the Casehttps://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/261264.pdf

PAGKALIWANGAN, BALDE, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDITG.R. No. 272465 | January 21, 2026 | En Banc | Inting, J.MADERA DOCTR...
26/08/2026

PAGKALIWANGAN, BALDE, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 272465 | January 21, 2026 | En Banc | Inting, J.

MADERA DOCTRINE ON RETURN OF DISALLOWED AMOUNTS

FACTS:
The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) granted Flying Risk Pay (FRP) to certain officials and employees under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776. COA later issued Notice of Disallowance No. 13-002 (2011), disallowing a total of P323,579.50 because the recipients’ functions were not inherently connected with aerial or flight operations and their positions were not included in the DBM-approved roster of FRP-eligible positions.

COA affirmed the disallowance and held the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable, while the recipient-payees were required to return the amounts they actually received. The petitioners invoked Madera v. Commission on Audit and claimed good faith.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the payment of Flying Risk Pay was valid under Section 30 of R.A. No. 776.
2. Whether the approving and certifying officers were liable to return the disallowed amounts.
3. Whether the recipient-payees were likewise required to return the amounts they received.

RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTLY GRANTED the petition. It upheld the disallowance of the FRP but modified the COA ruling on liability: the approving and certifying officers were ABSOLVED from solidary liability, while the recipient-payees remained individually liable to return the disallowed amounts they respectively received.

WHY THE FRP WAS DISALLOWED?
The Court held that Section 30 of R.A. No. 776 imposes a functional limitation. Flying Risk Pay is intended for personnel whose regular duties require regular and frequent aerial flights and whose functions are inherently connected with aircraft operations, navigation, flight safety, or similar technical and operational responsibilities.

Mere air travel in the performance of official duties does not qualify. Administrative, managerial, legal, or financial personnel who travel by aircraft merely as passengers to attend meetings, inspections, conferences, hearings, or other official engagements are not thereby entitled to FRP.

MADERA DOCTRINE: THE IMPORTANT PART

The Court emphasized that the validity of a Notice of Disallowance and the personal liability to return the disallowed amount are two separate questions. The fact that an expenditure is properly disallowed does NOT automatically mean that every approving or certifying officer must personally refund it.

VALID DISALLOWANCE ≠ AUTOMATIC PERSONAL LIABILITY
THE MADERA RULES ON RETURN
1. If the Notice of Disallowance is set aside: No return is required from the persons held liable.
2. Approving and certifying officers: They are not civilly liable if they acted in good faith, in the regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of a family.
3. Bad faith, malice, or gross negligence: Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted with any of these may be held solidarily liable for the net disallowed amount.
4. Recipient-payees: As a rule, they must return the amounts they actually received, even if they received them in good faith or merely as passive recipients, subject to the recognized Madera exceptions.
5. Exceptions for recipients: Return may be excused when the amount was genuinely given in consideration of services rendered under Rule 2(c), or when undue prejudice, social justice, or other bona fide considerations justify an exception under Rule 2(d).

APPLICATION OF MADERA TO THE APPROVING AND CERTIFYING OFFICERS
The Court found that the approving and certifying officers acted in good faith. At the time the FRP was granted in 2011, there was no Supreme Court precedent squarely interpreting Section 30 of R.A. No. 776. More importantly, COA Decision No. 2009-125 had previously lifted a disallowance involving similar FRP payments.
Thus, the officers relied on a then-prevailing interpretation issued by COA itself. The Court regarded that earlier COA ruling as a colorable legal basis. Although the Supreme Court later rejected that interpretation, it was a plausible reading of the law when the officers acted.

Under Madera, good faith is assessed based on the circumstances existing at the time the public officer acted. Because there was no showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the approving and certifying officers were absolved from solidary liability.

BADGES OF GOOD FAITH / DILIGENCE UNDER MADERA:

In determining whether an approving or certifying officer exercised proper diligence, the Court may consider: (1) a Certificate of Availability of Funds; (2) an in-house or Department of Justice legal opinion; (3) the absence of precedent disallowing a similar transaction; (4) a traditional agency practice with no prior disallowance; and (5) a reasonable textual interpretation supporting the legality of the transaction.
In Pagkaliwangan, the Court found particularly relevant the absence of contrary judicial precedent and the existence of a reasonable textual interpretation supported by the earlier COA decision.

WHY THE RECIPIENT-PAYEES STILL HAD TO RETURN THE MONEY?

Good faith does not have the same effect on recipient-payees. Under Madera, recipients are generally required to return amounts they were not legally entitled to receive, pursuant to unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.

The “services rendered” exception under Madera Rule 2(c) did not apply. As clarified in Abellanosa v. COA, the benefit must have a proper legal basis and be disallowed merely because of procedural irregularities, and it must have a clear, direct, and reasonable connection to the recipient’s official work for which the benefit was intended as additional compensation.
Here, the defect was substantive, not merely procedural. The recipients were not legally entitled to FRP because their duties did not involve the aerial-flight functions contemplated by law. Hence, they had to return the amounts they respectively received.

KEY DOCTRINE
Madera is not simply a “good faith” doctrine. It is a framework for determining civil liability after a COA disallowance has been sustained. The legality of the expenditure and the liability of the persons involved must be analyzed separately.

UPHELD DISALLOWANCE + GOOD-FAITH APPROVING OFFICER = MAY BE ABSOLVED
UPHELD DISALLOWANCE + BAD FAITH / MALICE / GROSS NEGLIGENCE = MAY BE SOLIDARILY LIABLE
RECIPIENT WITHOUT LEGAL ENTITLEMENT = GENERALLY MUST RETURN
DISPOSITION

The COA Decision and Resolution were AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The approving and certifying officers were ABSOLVED from solidary liability to return the net disallowed amount. The recipients of the Flying Risk Pay remained individually liable to return the disallowed amounts they respectively received.

Full text of the case: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/272465-concordia-s-pagkaliwangan-alex-b-balde-and-other-officers-and-employees-of-the-civil-aviation-authority-of-the-philippines-caap-represented-herein-by-captain-manuel-antonio-l-tamayo-vs/

For educational and legal discussion purposes.

25/08/2026
CASE DIGEST | NEW GUIDELINES ON NOTICE OF DISHONOR IN B.P. BLG. 22 CASESARNEL CARLOS and MARIVIC CARLOS v. PEOPLE OF THE...
24/08/2026

CASE DIGEST | NEW GUIDELINES ON NOTICE OF DISHONOR IN B.P. BLG. 22 CASES

ARNEL CARLOS and MARIVIC CARLOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TIRE STAR, INC.
G.R. No. 277047, April 15, 2026, En Banc
Ponente: J. Gaerlan

FACTS:
Spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos purchased tires from Tire Star, Inc. on installment and issued six post-dated checks as payment. The checks were subsequently dishonored because the bank account had been closed.Tire Star, through counsel, sent a formal demand containing the notice of dishonor, requiring the spouses to settle their obligation or make good on the dishonored checks within five banking days. Its messenger personally attempted to serve the notice on the spouses. According to his testimony, the spouses refused to receive the letter and instead instructed their employee to receive and sign for it.

The MeTC found the spouses guilty of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and the conviction was subsequently affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Before the Supreme Court, the spouses argued, among others, that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove their receipt of the notice of dishonor.

ISSUE:
Whether spouses Carlos were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, particularly whether the required notice of dishonor was sufficiently established.

RULING:

YES.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.For a successful prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22, the following elements must be established:The making, drawing, and issuance of a check to apply on account or for value;Knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that, at the time of issuance, he or she does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank; andSubsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or for the same reason had the drawer not ordered a stop payment without valid cause.

As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds when the drawer receives notice that the check was dishonored and fails, within five banking days, to pay the amount due or make arrangements for payment. Thus, proof of receipt of the notice of dishonor is material.

In this case, the Court found that the affirmative testimony and affidavit of proof of service prevailed over the spouses’ bare denial of receipt. The Court stressed that allowing a drawer to defeat prosecution simply by refusing to receive or later denying receipt of the notice would frustrate the purpose of B.P. Blg. 22.

IMPORTANT DOCTRINE: NEW GUIDELINES ON SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR

The significance of Carlos v. People lies in the Supreme Court’s clarification and standardization of the manner by which notice of dishonor may be served and proven in B.P. Blg. 22 cases.

1. PERSONAL SERVICE IS THE PRIMARY MODE
Notice of dishonor should primarily be personally delivered to the drawer.When the drawer transacts or issues the check through a company, or uses the company to act on his or her behalf in the ordinary course of business, the notice may be served at the company office upon a clerk or person in charge of the usual receipt of documents.

If no person is found in the office, or the office is unknown or nonexistent, the notice may be left at the drawer’s known residence between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. with a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein.

For personal service, the person effecting service must execute an affidavit under oath describing the date, time, place, manner of service, and the conduct of the recipient upon tender of the notice.

Whenever feasible, the service should also be documented by photographs and/or video recordings, subject to proper authentication during trial.

2. REGISTERED MAIL MAY BE USED WHEN PERSONAL SERVICE IS NOT PRACTICABLE

If personal service cannot practicably be made, the notice may be served by registered mail.The person effecting service must execute an affidavit stating the circumstances of the mailing, including the date of mailing, post office, name and address of the drawer, registry number, and the reason why personal service was not practicable. The registry receipt and return card should likewise be attached.

However, the Court emphasized that registry receipts and return cards do not, by themselves, prove receipt. The signature appearing on the registry return must be positively identified and authenticated as that of the drawer or of a person who received the notice on the drawer’s behalf.

3. ELECTRONIC SERVICE IS NOW EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED

The Supreme Court expressly recognized service of the notice of dishonor through electronic means, including:
Email, Viber, Facebook Messenger, and other comparable digital channels.

Electronic service may be used:
as a primary mode, when the drawer’s email address has been made available to the payee through official communications; or
as substituted service, when personal service is not practicable, such as when the drawer deliberately evades service, refuses receipt, unreasonably delays acknowledgment, or causes the notice to be received by a person not authorized to receive it.
The electronic contact details must be known, reasonably verified, attributable to, and actively used by the drawer or authorized representative.

Such attribution may be shown through prior message exchanges involving the same transaction, written or electronic confirmation of the account or number, prior use of the account to give instructions or acknowledgments, or other records attributable to the drawer.
When electronic service is used as substituted service, the electronic communication must attach or enclose the notice of dishonor and indicate the previous attempts at personal service. It must generally be sent within 24 hours from the final attempt at personal service.

4. AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE IS NOW MANDATORY

The Supreme Court categorically declared:
Regardless of the mode of service employed, an affidavit of service of the notice of dishonor is mandatory.
For electronic service, the affidavit and supporting documentation should establish, among others:
the date and time the communication was sent;
the email or message attaching the notice of dishonor;
the email address, account, or number used;
any delivery or read receipts, when available; and
where possible, an exported conversation file or downloaded chat history.

5. MERE DENIAL OF RECEIPT IS NOT SUFFICIENT
The Court further ruled that the drawer cannot simply claim:
“I did not receive the notice.”
For denial to prosper, the drawer must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him or her to have received the notice at the place and time when service was made.
Absent such proof, mere denial cannot overcome affirmative evidence establishing service.

DOCTRINE:
The notice of dishonor is material in B.P. Blg. 22 cases because it is essential in establishing the drawer’s knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. Hence, it must be served in a manner that ensures its receipt and its eventual admissibility as evidence in court.

A drawer cannot avoid liability merely by refusing to receive the notice or subsequently denying receipt. Properly documented affirmative evidence of service cannot be defeated by a bare denial.

The recognized modes are:
PERSONAL SERVICE → REGISTERED MAIL → ELECTRONIC SERVICE
Electronic service through email, Viber, Facebook Messenger, and comparable digital platforms may now be used, subject to the safeguards laid down by the Court.

Most importantly:
An affidavit of service is now mandatory regardless of the mode of service, and mere denial or refusal to receive the notice will not automatically defeat a B.P. Blg. 22 prosecution.

full case:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/G.R.-No.-277047-1.pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawT42bNwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMVZpUkN3c3Y0Rlo0ZHBJWTFzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEekHph7hZRKANjxYJMip7CCesoAsY3VdnEbOHiKKH6BRDTUqez9G13YqjoTQg_aem_9iojzOWjvqn0GnQkkEhDAQ

23/08/2026

𝐈𝐁𝐏 𝐂𝐑𝐄𝐃𝐈𝐓 𝐂𝐎𝐎𝐏𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐕𝐄 | 𝐁𝐔𝐈𝐋𝐓 𝐁𝐘 𝐋𝐀𝐖𝐘𝐄𝐑𝐒, 𝐅𝐎𝐑 𝐋𝐀𝐖𝐘𝐄𝐑𝐒

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) officially launches the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Credit Cooperative, a member-centered initiative established to support the financial well-being, professional goals, and long-term welfare of members of the legal profession.

Introduced during the 2026 IBP Southern Luzon Regional Convention on August 20, 2026, the IBP Credit Cooperative forms part of the continuing initiatives of the 27th IBP Board of Governors, under the leadership of IBP National President and Chairman of the 27th Board of Governors Atty. Allan G. Panolong, to strengthen programs that directly benefit members of the Bar.

The cooperative was introduced by Atty. Josemar Albano, IBP National Officer, who presented its vision as a financial community owned and governed by lawyers and designed around the needs of lawyers.

Through the cooperative, members may look forward to financial solutions and opportunities founded on the principles of integrity, transparency, accountability, mutual support, and sustainable growth.

Registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) in accordance with Republic Act No. 9520, or the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, the IBP Credit Cooperative represents another step toward building a stronger and more responsive professional community.

Members of the Bar who wish to become part of the IBP Credit Cooperative may access the Membership Form through the QR code provided or through the link below:

https://forms.gle/jiQKQr8RndVgBmvw9

Our Cooperative. Our Community. Our Growth. Our Future.
Join. Save. Grow. Thrive.

Good read.
20/08/2026

Good read.

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