Kalayaan Island Group, Palawan de Sur, PH

31/08/2020

Recto Bank: Why China covets what belongs to the Philippines
JUNE 14, 2019

PATERNO R. ESMAQUEL II

Recto Bank is said to contain most of the oil and natural gas in the West Philippine Sea. The Philippines owns it.

MANILA, Philippines – The sinking of a Philippine vessel in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) trained the spotlight on Recto Bank (Reed Bank), near the area where a Chinese vessel sank a boat of Filipinos.

What is Recto Bank, and why is it important?

Recto Bank is an underwater reef formation that is said to contain huge reserves of oil and natural gas in the West Philippine Sea.

While coveted by China, Recto Bank belongs to the Philippines.

A 2016 ruling of an international tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, said Recto Bank is part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ is the area 200 nautical miles from a coastal state's baselines, within which the coastal state has the exclusive rights to fish and exploit
resources.

Recto Bank is said to contain most of the oil and natural gas in the South China Sea, part of which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea.

In 2013, data from the United States Geological Survey said the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.

China however refuses to acknowledge the Hague ruling that asserted the Philippines' rights over Recto Bank and other portions of the West Philippine Sea.

China is open to joint exploration of the West Philippine Sea, but under the pretext that the sea belongs to them, not the Philippines. The Philippines cannot agree to this without violating its constitution.

Obstacles

The Asian giant's objection has prevented the Philippines, a developing country, from enjoying the benefits of Recto Bank.

"Since 2011, Chinese coast guard vessels have prevented Philippine-commissioned ships from undertaking oil and gas surveys in the Reed Bank, which is entirely within the Philippine EEZ," wrote Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in his ebook on the South China Sea.

Carpio added that China's 9-dash line, its demarcation to claim the entire South China Sea, "also cuts through Malampaya, the Philippines' largest operating gas field that supplies 40% of the energy requirement of Luzon," the Philippines' biggest island group.

"Malampaya will run out of gas in 10 years. There is urgency to develop Reed Bank as a replacement for the rapidly depleting Malampaya; otherwise, there will be 10 to 12 hours of brownouts everyday in Luzon 10 years hence," Carpio said.

There is another reason why oil exploration cannot resume in Recto Bank.

Recto Bank is covered by a 2014 moratorium on oil exploration, which was imposed by then-president Benigno Aquino III due to the case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea in 2013.

The Aquino moratorium stopped the Pangilinan-led Forum Energy from its oil exploration activities in Recto Bank.

Two years later, the Philippines already won the case that caused the moratorium.

In January this year, the Department of Energy urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to lift the oil exploration moratorium, following a request by Forum Energy in December 2018. The moratorium has not been lifted as of posting time.

Heated incident

Before this moratorium was put in place, Recto Bank was the site of a heated incident involving Forum Energy and the Chinese. A narration of these events is found in the 2016 Hague ruling on the South China Sea.

The incident involved M/V Veritas Voyager, a Singaporean vessel for seismic surveys, which was surveying Recto Bank for Forum Energy.

On March 1, 2011, two China Marine Surveillance (CMS) vessels and 7 Chinese fishing vessels approached the survey area in Recto Bank. The two CMS vessels followed Veritas Voyager for an hour, then ordered Veritas Voyager to leave the Recto Bank area.

Veritas Voyager stopped its survey of Recto Bank on March 2, 2011, because of the threat from the Chinese vessels.

Promptly, on the same day, the Philippines sent China a note verbale protesting the threats from Chinese surveillance vessels Zhongguo 71 and 75.

"The Philippine government views the aggressive actions of the Chinese vessels as a serious violation of Philippine sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction," the Philippines' note verbale stated.

Eventually, the Hague tribunal ruled in 2016 "that China has, through the operation of its maritime surveillance vessels in relation to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 and 2 March 2011 breached its obligations" under Article 77 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea "with respect to the Philippines' sovereign rights."

Aquino: 'What is ours is ours'

The Recto Bank incident of 2011 was also not lost on Aquino, the Philippine leader who brought China to court.

In his State of the Nation Address in June 2011, Aquino mentioned Recto Bank, drawing applause from the crowd and making headlines across the Philippines.

Aquino declared: "Malinaw ang pahiwatig natin ngayon sa buong mundo: Ang sa Pilipinas ay sa Pilipinas. Kapag tumapak ka sa Recto Bank, para ka na ring tumapak sa Recto Avenue."

(Now, our message to the world is clear: What is ours is ours. Setting foot on Recto Bank is no different from setting foot on Recto Avenue.)

Nearly a week after this year's Recto Bank incident, however, the China-friendly President Rodrigo Duterte is meeting it with silence. – Rappler.com

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Shared July 23, 2020

Text and Photo source: https://rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/reasons-china-covets-recto-bank-philippines

27/07/2020

Kalayaan Island Group, Palawan de Sur, PH
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Spratly Islands dispute

Spratly Islands
Spratly Is since NalGeoMaps.png
Spratly Islands military occupations map

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Spratly Islands dispute
Dangerous Ground (South China Sea)
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The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei, concerning "ownership" of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated "maritime features" (reefs, banks, cays, etc.) located in the South China Sea. The dispute is characterised by diplomatic stalemate and the employment of military pressure techniques (such as military occupation of disputed territory) in the advancement of national territorial claims. All except Brunei occupy some of the maritime features.

There has been a sharp rise in media coverage owing mainly to China's increasingly vocal objection to the presence of American naval vessels transiting the area in order to assert the right to freedom of navigation within international waters.

Most of the "maritime features" in this area have at least six names: The "International name", usually in English; the "Chinese name", sometimes different for PRC and ROC (and also in different character-sets); the Vietnamese, Philippine and Malaysian names, and also, there are alternate names (e.g. Spratly Island is also known as Storm Island), and sometimes names with European origins (French, Portuguese, Spanish, British, etc.).[1]

The Spratly Islands are important for economic and strategic reasons. The Spratly area holds potentially significant, but largely unexplored, reserves of oil and natural gas, it is a productive area for world fishing, it is one of the busiest areas of commercial shipping traffic, and surrounding countries would get an extended continental shelf if their claims were recognised. In addition to economic incentives, the Spratlys sit astride major maritime trade routes to Northeast Asia, giving them added significance as positions from which to monitor maritime activity in the South China Sea and to potentially base and project military force from. In 2014, China drew increased international attention due to its dredging activities within the Spratlys, amidst speculation it is planning to further develop its military presence in the area.[2] In 2015 satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef within the Spratlys whilst continuing its land reclamation activities at other sites.[3][4][5] Only China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Vietnam have made claims based on historical sovereignty of the islands.[6] The Philippines, however, claims part of the area as its territory under UNCLOS, an agreement parts of which[7] have been ratified by the countries involved in the Spratly islands dispute.

Reasons for the dispute
There are multiple reasons why the neighbouring nations in particular, and the rest of the world in general, would be interested in the Spratly Islands.

Hydrocarbons
In 1968, oil was discovered in the region.[8] The Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons (1.60 × 1010 kg),[citation needed] compared to the 13 billion tons (1.17 × 1010 kg) held by Kuwait, placing it as, potentially, the fourth largest reserve bed in the world. The United States Energy Information Administration contests this, estimating almost no oil and less than 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas exists in fields near the Spratly Islands.[9][10] Still, these large potential reserves have assisted in intensifying the territorial claims of the neighbouring countries.

In 1968 and 1970, the Philippines started to take their territorial claims more seriously and stationed troops on three islands which had been claimed by the adventurer Tomas Cloma as part of Freedomland.[11] In 1973, Vietnamese troops were stationed on five islands.[12]

On 11 March 1976, the first major Philippine oil discovery occurred off the coast of Palawan, near the Spratly Islands territory. In 2010, these oil fields supplied 15% of all petroleum consumed in the Philippines.[13] In 1992, the PRC and Vietnam granted oil exploration contracts to US oil companies that covered overlapping areas in the Spratlys. In May 1992,[14] the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Crestone Energy (a US company based in Denver, Colorado) signed a co-operation contract for the joint exploration of the Wan'an Bei-21 block, a 25,155 square kilometres (9,710 sq mi) section of the southwestern South China Sea that includes Spratly Island areas.[15] Part of the Crestone's contract covered Vietnam's blocks 133 and 134, where PetroVietnam, PetroStar Energy (US) and ConocoPhillips Vietnam Exploration & Production, a unit of ConocoPhillips, agreed to evaluate prospects in April 1992. This led to a confrontation between China and Vietnam, with each demanding that the other cancel its contract.

Commercial fishing
The region is one of the world's most productive areas for commercial fishing. In 2010, the Western Central Pacific (excluding the northernmost reaches of the South China Sea closest to the PRC coast) accounted for 14% of the total world catch at 11.7 million tonnes. This was up from less than 4 million tonnes in 1970.[16] The PRC has predicted that the South China Sea holds combined fishing and oil and gas resources worth one trillion dollars.[citation needed] There have already been numerous clashes between the PRC and the Philippines, PRC and Vietnam, and between other nations over "foreign" fishing vessels in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and the media[which?] regularly report the arrest of Chinese fishermen. In 1984, Brunei established an exclusive fishing zone encompassing Louisa Reef in the southeastern Spratly Islands.[17]

Commercial shipping
The region is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. During the 1980s, at least 270 ships passed through the Spratly Islands region each day. More than half of the world's supertanker traffic, by tonnage, passes through the region's waters every year. Tanker traffic through the South China Sea is over three times greater than through the Suez Canal and five times more than through the Panama Canal; 25% of the world's crude oil passes through the South China Sea.[citation needed]

Confrontations
There have been a number of notable clashes in the Spratly Islands, some of which are discussed in the following articles:

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea
Southwest Cay invasion (1975)
Johnson South Reef Skirmish (14 March 1988)
Scarborough Shoal standoff (commenced 8 April 2012)
Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff (2014)
International law

South China Sea claims and agreements.
Extended continental shelf claims, 2009
Via UNCLOS, the United Nations provided for countries with coastlines to submit claims to the UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),[18] (for their continental shelf to be extended beyond 200 nautical miles of their shores), by 13 May 2009. A total of 48 nations made full claims, and dozens more made preliminary submissions.[19] Two of the submissions made to the CLCS addressed claims in the South China Sea (SCS) – one by Vietnam for a claim over the northern portion of the SCS (which included the Paracel Islands), and another jointly by Vietnam and Malaysia for a joint claim over a "defined area" in the middle of the SCS between the two countries, which included part of the Spratly Islands. Brunei made a preliminary submission notifying of its intention to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its shores.[20]

China (PRC) immediately issued protests over the two submissions and called on the United Nations not to consider them. It also issued a stern warning to countries not to claim the islands which it said were its sovereign territory.[19][21]

Philippine protests to ITLOS, 2011
On 23 May 2011, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III warned the visiting Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie of a possible arms race in the region if tensions worsened over disputes in the South China Sea. In March, the Philippines complained that Chinese patrol boats had harassed a Philippine oil exploration vessel in disputed waters near the Spratlys, and subsequently filed a formal protest at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).[22]

Philippines submission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013–2016
Further information: Philippines v. China
On 22 January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People's Republic of China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).[23][24] On 19 February 2013, China rejected and returned the Philippines' Notification. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Registry in this arbitration.[24]

Philippine Justice Antonio T. Carpio states that the case is solely a maritime dispute, and not territorial in nature. The Philippines seeks clarification from the tribunal as to whether China's 9-dashed line can negate the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone as guaranteed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which China is a signatory. As part of the case, the Philippines also seeks clarification on whether rocks barely (1.8 meter) above water at high tide, (such as Scarborough Shoal), generate a 200-nautical-mile (370 km; 230 mi) EEZ, or only a 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial sea. Clarification of whether China can appropriate low-tide elevations, such as the Mischief Reef and the Subi Reef within the Philippines' EEZ, have also been included in the case. "The Philippines is not asking the tribunal to delimit by nautical measurements overlapping EEZs between China and the Philippines. The Philippines is also not asking the tribunal what country has sovereignty over an island, or rock above water at high tide, in the West Philippine Sea."[25]

According to a PCA press release on 12 July 2016 "[The] Tribunal concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’".[26]

Diplomatic moves
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea
On 22 July 1992, ASEAN issued a declaration on the South China Sea, emphasising that the dispute should be solved peacefully without resorting to violence.[27]

1995 Agreement
Following a 1995 dispute between the PRC and the Philippines, an ASEAN-brokered agreement was reached between the PRC and ASEAN member nations whereby one country would inform the other of any military movement within the disputed territory, and that there would be no further construction.[citation needed]

The agreement was promptly violated by PRC and Malaysia: claiming storm damage, seven PLA Navy vessels entered the area to repair "fishing shelters" in Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef); Malaysia erected a structure on Investigator Shoal and landed at Rizal Reef (Commodore Reef). In response, the Philippines lodged formal protests, demanded the removal of the structures, increased naval patrols in Kalayaan, and issued invitations to American politicians to inspect the PRC bases by plane.[citation needed]

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002
On 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea[28] was signed by the 10 foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and China (PRC). The parties explicitly undertook in this declaration, "to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned".[28] The parties also undertook to exercise self-restraint with activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, including refraining from inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features. The parties pledged to carry out confidence building measures, such as: holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defence and military officials; ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are in danger or distress; notifying on a voluntary basis other parties concerned of any impending joint / combined military exercise; and exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information. The parties may also explore or undertake cooperative activities such as: marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operations; and combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy, armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

The declaration eases tensions, but falls short of a legally binding code of conduct.

Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
In July 2012, China (PRC) announced that it is open to launching discussions on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but called for all parties to exercise self-restraint in keeping with the spirit of previous declarations and United Nation conventions. This announcement has been criticised by many neighbouring states because of the contradictions seen in the Scarborough Shoal at that time where China has established de facto control.[29]

On 2 August 2012, the United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution declaring that China's July 2012 actions to unilaterally assert control of disputed territories in the South China Sea "are contrary to agreed upon principles with regard to resolving disputes and impede a peaceful resolution."[30]

Chinese dredging activities

Subi Reef being built up into an artificial island, 2015
In 2014 Janes reported that during 2013–2014 China had begun a substantial program of dredging and land reclamation at three sites in the Spratlys. Janes concluded that 'The strategic effect of China's dredging and land reclamation makes it the most significant change to the South China Sea dispute since the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish. If completed as envisioned in the CGI designs, China will have its first airstrip in the Spratly islands – and a base from which to impose its interpretation of the surrounding features' sovereignty'.[2]

Janes also noted that in contrast to the previous construction projections of other countries in the Spratlys, 'The main difference between these activities and China's is that they modified existing land masses, while Beijing is constructing islands out of reefs that for the most part were under water at high tide'.

There is no known official term for the projects; the phrase "great wall of sand" was first used by Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, in March 2015.[31]

2015 construction of an airfield at Fiery Cross Reef
In April 2015 new satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield at Fiery Cross Reef, in addition to its ongoing dredging activities in the Spratlys.[4] In September, China had completed a 3125-metre runway.[32]

25/07/2020

Flashpoints on the Periphery: Understanding China’s Neighborhood Opportunism

How is China taking advantage of the pandemic to pursue its foreign policy goals?

By Suyash Desai..............May 28, 2020
This article is presented by
Diplomat Risk Intelligence, The Diplomat’s consulting and analysis division. Learn more here

FLASHPOINTS | RISK INTELLIGENCE | SECURITY | EAST ASIA

Credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, Pool
Tensions in China’s periphery have increased dramatically over the past few months as Beijing stepped up the use of military and diplomatic tools within its neighborhood. The frequency of the events involving Chinese actors, especially in the second half of March, increased as normalcy started returning to the mainland after the COVID-19 pandemic’s outbreak.

This raises a few questions. First, is this evidence of China’s opportunism at a time when the United States is struggling to maintain its presence in the East and Southeast Asian regions? Second, has Beijing adopted a more aggressive approach for the post-pandemic period? Third, would the recent spike in activities impact the regional order?

Before answering these questions, it is vital to understand the chronology of the events that have led to the rise of current tensions in the PRC’s periphery. Indonesia was the first country since the outbreak of the virus to face Chinese coercion, in waters around the Natuna Islands. Dozens of Chinese fishing vessels along with coast guard es**rts, in December 2019, entered waters off the Natuna Islands, which are within Jakarta’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These waters are also claimed by the PRC, thus leading to a month-long standoff between the two countries. Meanwhile, the Chinese armed forces were also involved in multiple military drills around Taiwan since January 2020. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force also carried out an unusual night-time sortie over the sea of southwest Taiwan on March 16, 2020. The increase of tactical military activities has been accompanied by assertive rhetoric, especially since the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen on January 11, 2020.

Furthermore, in the last week of March, a Chinese fishing boat collided with and damaged a Japanese destroyer in the East China Sea. In the same week, a Chinese vessel also collided with and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in the South China Sea. These are besides the “research and exploration” activities of an infamous Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, in Vietnam and Malaysia’s EEZ. The survey vessel, which arrived in Malaysia’s EEZ with an es**rt of Chinese Coast Guard ships, was involved in a face-off with the oil exploration vessel contracted by Malaysian state energy company Petronas.

Moreover, the PRC’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, in a recent move, approved the establishment of the Xisha and Nansha districts, subdivisions of the city of Sansha on Hainan Island. Xisha will govern the Paracels and surrounding waters, while Nansha will cover the Spratly Islands and adjacent waters. China followed up by renaming over 80 topographical features in the South China Sea, a move indicating the Chinese assertion of sovereignty over the disputed region. Previously, Beijing made such a move in 1983 when it identified 287 features in the South China Sea region. Meanwhile, the Liaoning aircraft carrier task group also sailed through the East and South China Seas, conducting month-long exercises before returning to Qingdao naval port in Shandong province.

Recently, the PRC has gotten involved in a few scuffles with India at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This has led to an intense face-off between the two countries at three points on the LAC: the Galwan Valley region, Pangong Tso, and Demchok. The situation remains tense. Perhaps, more than post-pandemic opportunism, the events on the LAC could be attributed to rising Chinese insecurities due to India’s improved border infrastructure in these areas. Regardless, a recent report in an Indian newspaper shows a big surge in the number of Chinese transgressions across the LAC as compared to the same period in 2019.

Most of these instances, especially since the COVID-19 outbreak, indicate a clear pattern of increasing Chinese aggression in its neighborhood. The PRC senses a conducive opportunity for asserting its claims on the disputed territories in its periphery, especially the South China Sea, as the United States remains focused on fighting the COVID-19 outbreak at home. Besides, the United States’ Asia-Pacific security cover, which is an insurance policy for many East and Southeast Asian states, was exposed, temporarily, due to multiple COVID-19 infections at forward military bases and naval vessels in the western Pacific region. For instance, the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the USS Ronald Regan, the two U.S. aircraft carriers currently in the western Pacific, were immobilized due to reported COVID-19 cases among their crew. With a weakened and distracted United States, the PRC aimed to exploit a rare window of opportunity where it could coerce the regional states to toe its line using military and civilian tools in its neighborhood.

The aggressive posturing also helps the PRC forward its domestic propaganda and assert the notion of having contained the COVID-19 outbreak. Besides, regime security is of the highest importance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and is regularly manifested through the mainland’s foreign and security policies. Recent actions in its neighborhood also help the PRC to create a false notion of Chinese nationalism to better control the pushback generated due to the CCP’s mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak in the initial stages.

But, as argued by Abraham Denmark, Charles Edel, and Siddharth Mohandas in their recent War on the Rocks article, there is no novelty in Beijing’s post-pandemic aggressive behavior. “It is consistent with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s approach of flexibility, assertiveness and singular desire to exploit enemies’ weakness,” they argue. However, unlike in the recent past, the PRC this time has gotten involved with all the regional and extraregional stakeholders at the same time in the East and South China Seas. Beijing, in normal circumstances, uses civilian tools like armed fishing vessels in the South China Sea and military and diplomatic tools in case of Taiwan to assert its sovereign claims. But this time, it has relied on all the three tools of statecraft — military, civilian, and diplomatic — to forward its sovereignty claims on the disputed regions in the East and South China Seas, which makes its posture more aggressive.

While the PRC is trying to capitalize on the opportunity to assert its sovereignty in its neighborhood, the United States, despite being weakened due to multiple military infections at forward bases and vessels, also aimed at exploiting the anger over Beijing’s ambitions. It has responded to the PRC’s aggression by carrying out four freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) around the Paracels and the Spratlys since January 2020. Responding to the PRC’s recent actions, it dispatched an amphibious assault ship, USS America and a guided-missile cruiser, the Bunker Hill, in the contested waters of Malaysia. An Australian frigate, HMAS Parramatta, and a third U.S. vessel, the USS Barry, also joined the two U.S. warships in the South China Sea. However, as argued by M. Taylor Fravel in his latest article for the Washington Post, the approach reflects the continuity of dealing with the region, despite the pandemic.

Beijing’s post-pandemic behavior has also ruffled a few feathers of the regional and extraregional actors in the East and Southeast Asian theaters. In a rare criticism, Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines called out the PRC for ramming a Vietnamese vessel. The Philippine’s Department of Foreign Affairs noted that such incidents undermine the potential of a genuinely deep and trusting regional relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China. Both Vietnam and Malaysia, two other countries affected by the Chinese activities in the South China Sea, have highlighted the PRC’s aggressive behavior in their EEZs. Mike Pompeo, the U.S. secretary of state, has also tried to rally ASEAN countries to call out Chinese aggression in a united voice. But it would be difficult to imagine these states overtly balancing against the PRC and thus attempting to change the regional order.

Only Beijing’s escalatory moves — for instance, actions like attempting to change the existing status quo by capturing features occupied by Vietnam or the Philippines, introduction of amphibious capabilities in the South China Sea or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea — would most probably push the regional states toward overt balancing in the future. Otherwise, there is a very low likelihood of current events having an impact on the existing regional order.

Thus, the United States and its allies need to understand the recent Chinese opportunism in the region as not as a novel approach but a continuation of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s aggressive policies with the introduction of new elements in it. The regional order will only be impacted if Beijing makes escalatory moves, which looks unlikely in the near future.
The author:
Suyash Desai is a research analyst working on China’s defense and foreign policies at the Takshashila Institution, Bangalore, India. He writes a weekly newsletter on the Chinese armed forces called the PLA Insight.
Shared July 25, 2020

Source:

How is China taking advantage of the pandemic to pursue its foreign policy goals?