30/08/2026
The World Is Changing, Where Does Pakistan Stand?
History bears witness to the fact that no global order remains permanent. Empires rise and fall, centres of power shift, new economic powers emerge, and old alliances evolve in response to changing realities. In the third decade of the 21st century, the world once again appears to be standing at a historic crossroads. The growing tensions between Iran and the United States, the Russia-Ukraine war, the economic and technological rivalry between China and the United States, the Gaza crisis, and mounting tensions from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz suggest that the world is not merely passing through another crisis; it is witnessing the gradual formation of a new global order.
The Middle East has become one of the principal theatres of this emerging order. Its importance goes far beyond oil and gas reserves. Its geographical position connects Asia, Europe and Africa, making the region central to global trade, energy security and strategic competition. Every major development in the Middle East therefore carries consequences far beyond the region itself.
The Iran-US confrontation has further exposed this transformation. What was once largely a diplomatic and strategic dispute has evolved into a crisis with military, economic, energy and diplomatic dimensions. The Strait of Hormuz remains particularly critical because any major disruption there would not be confined to the Gulf states; it could have serious consequences for the major economies of the world.
The Middle East is therefore no longer merely a theatre of regional politics. It has become a central arena for competition over energy, global trade, maritime routes, defence alliances, technology and the balance of power. Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Riyadh, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Islamabad are all viewing the crisis through the lens of their respective national interests.
Against this backdrop, at least five possible scenarios could emerge over the next five to ten years.
First Scenario: Limited Tensions and a Fragile Balance of Power
The most plausible scenario may be one in which the fundamental tensions between Iran, the United States and Israel continue, but none of the major actors wants a full-scale war that could engulf the entire region. Limited military operations, economic sanctions, cyberattacks, intelligence activities and diplomatic pressure could remain instruments of state policy.
The world may consequently enter a prolonged grey zone between war and peace — a situation in which tensions remain high but all major actors attempt to prevent them from crossing a threshold that could trigger a devastating regional conflict.
Second Scenario: The Expansion of Proxy Conflicts
Even if direct confrontation remains limited, regional fronts in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf waters could continue to experience instability. State and non-state actors may be used to exert pressure without triggering direct confrontation between major powers.
The consequences would extend far beyond the battlefield. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab or the Red Sea could affect oil prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and the prices of essential commodities. Prolonged instability could also push Gulf states to invest more heavily in alternative ports, pipelines and trade routes designed to reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints.
Third Scenario: Diplomatic Accommodation and a New Regional Balance
A more hopeful possibility is that the economic and political costs of prolonged confrontation eventually persuade the major actors to return to negotiations. China, European countries, Türkiye or other regional powers could play a facilitating role.
For Pakistan, this could create an important diplomatic opportunity. Its geographical proximity to Iran, longstanding ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, strategic partnership with China and diplomatic relations with the United States give Islamabad the potential to serve as a channel of communication.
But such a role would only be credible if Pakistan avoided becoming the spokesman for any one side and instead pursued genuine and balanced diplomacy.
Fourth Scenario: A New Cold War and Global Bloc Politics
The economic, technological, commercial and military rivalry between the United States and China is already intensifying, while Russia continues to challenge Western influence. If this competition deepens, the world could increasingly divide into competing power blocs.
Yet this would not be a repetition of the Cold War of the 20th century. The principal battlegrounds would be artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cyber capabilities, energy, space technology, defence systems, maritime routes and global supply chains.
For Pakistan, the greatest danger in such an environment would be unnecessary alignment with one bloc. Islamabad would need to maintain its strategic partnership with China while preserving active and constructive relations with the United States, Europe, the Gulf states and other global centres of power.
Africa: The Next Arena of Global Competition
The changing alignment of African countries is another important indication of the transformation under way. Countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia are maintaining relations with the United States and Europe while simultaneously expanding trade, infrastructure and investment links with China. Russia, meanwhile, has sought to expand its influence in parts of Africa through defence cooperation, energy and access to strategic resources.
South Africa has emerged as an important advocate of a more multipolar international system through BRICS, while Egypt continues to balance its strategic and economic interests among the United States, China, Russia and the Gulf states. In parts of the Sahel, resistance to Western military involvement has created additional space for non-Western powers.
Africa's reserves of cobalt, lithium, uranium and other critical minerals are increasingly important to the future of advanced technology and the global energy transition. Africa is therefore no longer merely a continent associated with development assistance; it is becoming an important arena for competition over resources, markets, ports and geopolitical influence.
East Asia: The New Technology Battlefield
East Asia is also witnessing a profound transformation in the balance of power. China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN countries are key actors in this evolving geopolitical landscape.
China is expanding its influence through economic strength, technological capabilities, maritime power and the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States, meanwhile, is strengthening security partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia and other regional allies to balance China's growing influence.
Japan and South Korea remain closely linked to the US security architecture while maintaining deep economic ties with China. ASEAN countries, for their part, have generally sought to avoid choosing one camp outright, preferring to maintain strategic flexibility among China, the United States, Japan and other economic powers.
Taiwan's central role in the global semiconductor industry makes this competition even more sensitive. East Asia is therefore no longer simply a contest over military power; it is increasingly a contest over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, trade, maritime routes and advanced technology.
Fifth Scenario: The Rise of Geoeconomics
The most hopeful scenario would be one in which major powers conclude that prolonged conflict is ultimately damaging to their own economies and that competition should increasingly shift from the battlefield to trade, investment, technology, energy and infrastructure.
Competition would not disappear; its nature would change. States would seek influence through markets rather than merely through military power, through technology rather than missiles, and through trade corridors rather than traditional battlefields. In such a world, geography would remain important, but geoeconomics would become an equally decisive measure of national power.
For Pakistan, the first lesson from these possible scenarios is the need for a balanced foreign policy. China is an important strategic partner; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are vital economic partners and major destinations for Pakistani workers; the United States remains central to the global financial and diplomatic system; and Iran is Pakistan's immediate neighbour.
Pakistan therefore needs a genuinely multi-vector foreign policy based on national interest rather than permanent alignment with any single power.
The second requirement is economic sovereignty. A weak economy inevitably constrains foreign policy. Pakistan cannot take advantage of shifting global alignments without increasing exports, strengthening industrial production, investing in technology, attracting foreign investment and developing its human capital.
The third requirement is energy security. The crisis in the Middle East has demonstrated once again that oil prices and the security of maritime routes can become fundamental challenges for an import-dependent economy. Pakistan must therefore invest in solar, wind, hydropower, nuclear energy and other indigenous and alternative sources of energy.
The fourth priority is active diplomacy. Pakistan should not seek a diplomatic role only when a crisis erupts. It needs sustained engagement with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, China and the Gulf states. Continuous diplomatic engagement can enhance Pakistan's ability to act as a bridge between competing regional and global interests.
The fifth and most fundamental requirement is domestic stability. No country can play an effective international role without political stability, strong institutions, economic discipline, quality education, scientific research and national consensus. International respect ultimately rests on domestic strength.
The emerging global order will not be shaped by military power alone. Economic strength, technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, cyber capabilities, diplomacy, human capital and geography will increasingly determine national influence. Countries that invest in these areas will have a greater voice in shaping the future, while those relying solely on traditional military strength may gradually find themselves responding to decisions made by others.
The Middle East crisis has also demonstrated that regional powers are no longer merely passive followers of global powers. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are maintaining their relations with Washington while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, Russia and other centres of power. Middle and smaller states are increasingly seeking room for manoeuvre by balancing among competing powers rather than permanently aligning with one.
This is where Pakistan's real challenge lies. Islamabad has geography, a large and young population, a strategic relationship with China, deep human and economic links with the Gulf, a shared border with Iran and diplomatic relations with the major powers. If these assets are brought together through a coherent national strategy, the current global transformation could become not only a source of risk but also a historic opportunity.
History will ultimately ask which nations merely watched while the world changed and which prepared themselves for the world that was coming.
The current crisis in the Middle East may well mark the closing chapter of an old geopolitical era and the beginning of a new one.
Pakistan has a choice: to remain merely a pawn on a changing geopolitical chessboard, or to use its geography, economic potential and diplomatic relevance to emerge as a balanced, dignified and active state.
The world is changing. Centres of power are shifting, alliances are evolving and even the nature of conflict is changing.
The real question is no longer where the world is heading.
The real question is: where will Pakistan position itself in the changing world?
Faisal Mirza
