DFIR-Vietnam

DFIR-Vietnam Providing Digital Forensics and Incident Response services to organisations in Vietnam

21/04/2022

We are hiring !!!!! We are looking 2 talents to join our team ;)

About Smyrna Software

We are a small development team (6 people) working on big data analytics projects using IaaS public clouds (Amazon AWS, Digital Ocean and Google GCP). We design, build and maintain systems for clients in the United Kingdom and South America, working with the complete lifecycle of the software development process using cutting edge technologies.

We are searching for a Frontend Developer/ Python Developer / DevOps engineer to join our team.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Responsibilities:

Triage bugs and implement/test fixes on our products
Interact with our clients using Github as a support portal
Develop new features in our codebase
Design and develop new microservice APIs
Monitor and maintain production systems.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Skills required:

Must to know HTML/CSS/JS/JQuery (Frontend developer).
Programming experience with python3.
Familiarity with Github process flows (branches, pull requests, code reviews)
Working knowledge of Linux and familiarity with docker and the Linux CLI
Experience working with SQL databases and Redis.
Good English communication skills (written and spoken)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Good to have:

Experience with selenium for browser automation
Experience with Swagger / OpenAPI specifications in microservice environments
Experience with Kubernetes or Amazon ECS
Experience with Github Actions or Jenkins
Working knowledge of Content Delivery Networks (Cloudflare, AWS Cloudfront)
Knowledge of Spanish or Portuguese

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Job benefits:

XX million net salary
13 month bonus
Private Health insurance
Flexible working environment.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please contact/send CV through email:

[email protected] or

Telephone number:

0935044840 - Mr.Liem

Top 100 passwords in Vietnam   Weak passwords are an easy way attackers use to get into systems or networks. All interne...
13/12/2020

Top 100 passwords in Vietnam




Weak passwords are an easy way attackers use to get into systems or networks. All internet exposed servers, website login forms and email addresses are constantly being scanned by automatic scripts trying to “guess” passwords. If any of your passwords are easy to guess, or on the “most common” lists, your organization will have a breach soon.

Attack types
From a network defense and incident response perspective, the question is to understand which credentials are routinely tried to break into accounts (so we can avoid using them). These are of two types:

Non-targeted attacks: These use lists of most common passwords that are widely available. There are many of such lists available, with the best source being SecLists (https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists) by Daniel Miessler and Jason Haddix.
Targeted attacks: These use lists of already compromised credentials for a particular organization. This is a problem in large companies, where staff members may use the same corporate email and associated password to create third party accounts (Instagram, Zalopay…etc). If Instagram or Zalopay gets hacked and the password falls into the wrong hands, attackers will attempt to reuse them on corporate services.
These two types are related, the list of most common passwords are generated by aggregating hundreds of database leaks. However looking at the current top 15 most commonly used passwords (at the time of writing – May 2018) we have: [111111, 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, abc123, dragon, iloveyou, letmein, monkey, password, qwerty, tequiero, test]. At first sight, this list is very US centric (all words are English or Spanish). So at DFIR VN labs, we asked ourselves the question:

“what are the most common passwords used by Vietnamese speakers?”


Surely it will contain Vietnamese words or be based around numbers as users find vietnamese special characters and tones difficult to type on password fields (as autocorrect can not be used).

Vietnamese leaked credentials
Where to start? Leaked credentials on the .vn TLD are rare. The most common domain name seen on historic leaked credentials is “yahoo.com.vn” and those leaks are under 0.04% of all accounts leaked worldwide (barely 1.2 million accounts our of 3.5 billion leaks worldwide on the DFIR VN lab databases). Other common domains are zing.vn (with 70,000 leaks) and gmail.com.vn (with about 20,000). This is quite common, as most users will use email addresses that are not on the .vn TLD (gmail.com…etc). This would, of course, prevent any analysis, as we will have no way to know whether those users are Vietnamese or not (without additional information).

But this changed at the end of April 2018 (barely 5 days before this article was written).

As reported in the local news, a large database with 163 million credentials was leaked form VNG Corporation (https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/business/20180428/vietnams-tech-giant-vng-apologizes-after-alleged-data-breach-affecting-163mn-accounts/45340.html). This is quite a large breach and the corpus (for a total of 34GB, now publicly available in torrent sites and database leaks forums) is big enough to perform some statistical analysis.

Not all accounts on the set contained email addresses, as the majority of the accounts only had usernames. Only 25 million distinct emails were on the database. For individual users, if you want to check whether your account is within that 25 million subset you should check the excellent site “Have I been pwned” run by Troy Hunt, who added the VNG dataset barely two days after the leak was published.

A sample of the lines retrieved (with heavy redactions to mask confidential information) is below:

84988484,[redacted],504865,25F9E794323B453885F5181F1B624D0B,,[redacted],13,quehuong,1,789456123,1955-08-24 00:00:00.0,63,[redacted]6789,ha nam,,18,,2010-05-28 10:20:58.813,21,2010-05-28 10:16:35.86,,98560,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988485,[redacted],768,43B405A57C86F22A06ABD75824B841E5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2010-05-28 09:36:05.893,3,2010-05-28 09:36:05.893,,768,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988511,[redacted],1570337,E36A2F90240E9E84483504FD4A704452,06DC67758E6BD6F8B089AEE4A915441E,[redacted],16,d9b8e8f09aea13fab32b8b75dce76192,1,b[redacted]
84988670,[redacted],768,E807F1FCF82D132F9BB018CA6738A19F,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2010-05-28 08:23:50.237,50,2010-05-28 08:23:50.237,,768,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988734,[redacted],390689,B461C2E02715AFCE5A69C861D468A285,5D5F9EAE00052AE36A35DEE977902BB8,[redacted],13,00c0498b0603bc0b3e72446ae5f41ec9,1,[redacted]1992-10-29 00:00:00.0,,ha noi,,43,,2011-12-09 18:09:22.907,56,2010-05-28 08:14:46.69,,768,0,2,,,,,,,,2011-12-09 18:08:50.357,2011-12-09 18:08:50.357,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988778,[redacted],768,D6CD7880933606CAB470D822596E20DC,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2010-05-28 15:20:54.233,5,2010-05-28 15:20:54.233,,768,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988863,[redacted],768,25F9E794323B453885F5181F1B624D0B,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2010-05-28 05:59:28.317,16,2010-05-28 05:59:28.317,,768,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
84988885,[redacted],1555491,30047333851ED60047066A5FD566C11A,,[redacted],10,205d183506fb596a2cebc399d72a3d28,,012782037,,,[redacted],00:00:00.0,01262262201,[redacted],,43,,2012-07-04 12:27:20.81,38,2010-05-28 06:55:08.05,,98560,1,8,,,,,,,,2011-12-22 10:40:10.92,2011-07-18 17:16:12.103,2011-12-22 10:52:53.21,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

25F9E794323B453885F5181F1B624D0B or 205d183506fb596a2cebc399d72a3d28 ... are the passwords as encoded on the VNG database. Unfortunately for VNG users the passwords were stored using the MD5 algorithm. This algorithm is quite old (design by Ron Rivest in 1991) and has the advantage of being very fast. The operation to verify that the string “password” corresponds to the MD5 encoding “5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99” takes a minuscule amount of time on modern hardware. Optimized programs running on graphics cards (CUDA, OpenCL) can easily calculate about 1 billion hashes per second.

However, this blazingly fast speed is NOT a good thing when safely storing passwords. While the service authenticating users will go slightly faster (and probably will save a few seconds of CPU power per day), if the database is leaked, attackers can then bruteforce the list with dictionaries at very high speeds. A better choice for password algorithm would be Argon2 (which was the winner of the 2015 Password Hashing Competition), pbkdf2 or bcrypt (which have more widespread library support). This algorithms are purposedly slower to prevent attackers from succesfully obtaining the decoded passwords.

Dehashing the VNG database
A quick analysis on the VNG database showed that password reuse was very common. The 163 million accounts only used about 33.8 million distinct passwords. These hashes were extracted on to a separate list.

Once the hashes have been extracted from the database we needed to brueoforce them. The most efficient way is to use hashcat on a system with a suitable graphics card. For this exercise we used (in order to limit ourselves) to 24 hours’ worth of Amazon Web Services time p2.xlarge which runs a single Nvidia K80 GPU. The cost of the exercise was $0.30 per hour, so approx 175,000 VND in total for the day.

On those 24 hours we did run several cracking sessions with different settings and dictionaries. The average cracking speed was 250 million MD5 hashes per second.

The end result was that 22.3 million distinct passwords were cracked (65.9% of the total of distinct passwords). Given that the most common passwords are typically easier to guess, the list obtained did correspond to which did also correspond to 131.9 million credentials on the full list (81% of all accounts).

So, what are the most common 100 passwords on this Vietnamese-centric leak

We can see the following patterns:

Numeric passwords (52 out of 100), typical as tones are historically not used in passwords due to character set incompatibilities.
ASCII patterns (16 out of 100): nonsensical patters, either keyboard rows walks or letter repetition
Vietnamese phrases (21 out of 100):
anhyeuem at #5
maiyeuem at #26
anhtuan at #36
annhoem at #41
emyeuanh at #46
Only 2 english phrases (mylove and iloveyou) appear on the top 100 list.

The full set of lists generated are available on our Github repository
https://github.com/richiemann/vietnam-password-lists

Recommendations
The large use of numeric passwords in Vietnam makes guessing passwords very easy. Attempting to log in with the top 500 passwords would approximately break into 33% of accounts (1 in 3).

This a marked cultural difference with English based password lists. On those, numeric passwords are in use at a much reduced rate (10-20%). For example, the 2017 English top 100 passwords list by Slashdata only has 14 numeric passwords. Additionally, bruteforcing numeric only passwords is a lot less complex, given that we have a smaller set of 10 characters to build a password [0-9] than the full alphanumeric upper/lowercase of 62 [0-9a-zA-Z]. Once could bruteforce all possible 16 digit numbers in a few hours on a single graphics card.

So, what could Vietnamese internet users do to consistently avoid bad passwords?

For individuals:

Use a password manager (even on mobile devices). At DFIR VN we recomment Keypass for individuals and 1Password for teams. Both support mobile devices. These will generate random complex, virtually uncrackable passwords for any service.
Use two factor authentication (SMS, numeric codes using Google Authenticator or a physical key like a Yubikey).
Keep track of data breaches subscribing to services like “‘;–have I been pwned?” run by Troy Hunt.
For companies:

Create a written password policy for the company. A good start is the latest NIST recommendation SP800-63-3 which removes the need for regular password changes and no more complexity rules, but at the expense of password audits and an 8 character minimum limit.
Perform password audits using common lists like the ones shared in this article. Attempt to break into those accounts yourself before malicious actors do and trigger automatic password changes if they are in use. “Hack yourself first”.
Make password bruteforcing difficult (use rate-limiting mechanisms) on those services exposed. Block further attempts after 10 failed logins for a period of time, block logins from non-standard IP addresses…etc.
For application developers:

Store passwords securely. Do not store passwords in plaintex, or using MD5 or SHA functions. Use argon2, bcrypt or pkbdf2 to encrypt and store passwords (https://github.com/riverrun/comeonin/wiki/Choosing-the-password-hashing-algorithm).
Integrate password lists with your backend services to prevent users from setting common passwords that have already been leaked online. You can use our lists or other lists available like the Pwned Password v2 list.

In short, password based security in Vietnam appears to be a lot weaker than initially thought. Vietnamese users (companies, developers and individuals) should take some of the easy measures outlined here in order to prevent further problems.

Forensics on Google cloud email  As seen in our Vietnam cloud email study, 17% of all email infrastructure on the Vietna...
13/12/2020

Forensics on Google cloud email




As seen in our Vietnam cloud email study, 17% of all email infrastructure on the Vietnam DNS top level domain (.vn) is based on Google cloud. Google cloud email (also known as GSuite) is the single largest provider of email cloud services in Vietnam, being 5 times larger than the second largest provider – Zoho.

For custom domains (not the free accounts at gmail.com), the Google email offer is based on G Suite (formerly called Google Apps). There are three available service levels at different prices:

Basic ($5/user/month)
Business ($10/user/month): Basic + unlimited cloud storage + smart search + archive retention + user activity tracking
Enterprise ($25/user/month): Business + data loss prevention +S/MIME encryption + email archiving + advanced electronic discovery settings

But, how do these features affect forensic investigations? DFIR VN often finds situations where email accounts are suspected to have been broken into by unauthorised users. How much information about each account does Google email make available? This article studies a similar setup on one of our domain names (dfir.com.vn).

The typical breach accesses a mailbox via webmail, as configuring an email client or a mobile device causes a lot more points of information to be tracked. As forensic investigators we are interested in anything that can help us monitor this:

Per mailbox Session tracking (user, source IP address, timestamp, any information about connected devices – User Agents)
Log retention, specifically how many days of logs are available at any point in time.
Type of events logged (login success/failure, password changes…etc).
GSuite Basic provides all this however, the information has to be collected at different points.

The first point of call is for the individual user to check its own activity list, accessible from the main Gmail screen on a small link on the bottom right (see green spot)

The list will contain:

Any browser based sessions (webmail) with the full User Agent (which will indicate OS, browser version) and source IP address. Indicated by the last time the screen was refreshed or user logged in.
Any authorized applications (typically email clients connecting via POP3 or IMAP). The time will be one the last known connection and will contain the name of the email client (but no operating system). The email client can be disconnected here.
Accesses from mobile devices, however the details here are very limited. There is no make/model or even last seen timestamp on the list. This is compensated by My Account – “Device Activity & Security Events”, which has a much more detailed view. However this is not of any consequence on typical forensics cases, as attackers tend to use webmail to access compromised accounts, in order to give out as little information as possible.

GSuite Enterprise does not add further “basic” forensic information, but the added feature set aims to improve security with active measures (https://support.google.com/a/answer/7284269):

Data Loss Prevention in Google Drive: scanning content on Google Drive files and generate alerts
Data Loss Prevention in Email: Also scanning content on email and trigger responses (quarantine, reject or censor a message)
Automatic OCR (optical character recognition) on images to extract text – and add to the DLP measures above
Third party email archiving
BigQuery log retention, which can be configure to keep logs indefinitely. (https://support.google.com/a/answer/7233312)
Hosted email encryption and advanced mobile device management rules.
The only area relevant for forensics would be the enhanced interval of log retention using BigQuery, which will take the archive beyond the stated 30 day email log retention on Basic and Business.

In Summary:

GSuite Basic – likely the most common offering used by companies in Vietnam – has a lot of forensic information available, but has limited log retention and no coverage on Google Drive events.

GSuite Business is a very important upgrade for those organisations that use Google Drive as their main storage, as this is the minimum level of server that provides useful forensic information there.

GSuite Enterprise should be used by organisations that handle confidential or sensitive information. This version adds both active measures to prevent information leaks and unlimited log retention.

------------------ Thế Giới Di Động database leaks ---------------  On November 1st 2018, a new user under the name “Erw...
13/12/2020

------------------ Thế Giới Di Động database leaks ---------------




On November 1st 2018, a new user under the name “Erwincho” registered onto RaidForums – a well known site with over 150,000 members where users post leaked databases that have normally become publicly available elsewhere in hacking forums. His first step in the forum was to upload a database allegedly leaked from Thegiodidong.com, the Vietnamese electronics and white goods retailer, claiming to have compromised internal systems at the company and gained access to user databases and credit card details.

The response to the Erwincho’s posts was overwhelming, with many Vietnamese users quickly registering to the forum in order to ascertain whether their personal information had been leaked – which would lead to card cancellations, or personal details being leaked. So far, the three posts by Erwincho have over 700 replies, with over 200,000 views.

At the time of writing (November 8th) we estimate that Erwincho’s leak had been downloaded between 150 and 200 times.

The release has hit the local news with Tuoi Tre News reporting it on November 8th – leading to a spike on the forum readership. In the article the head of IT at The Gioi Di D**g has been reported confirming that the information is false – and that “Hackers might have obtained the addresses from other online sources and claimed that they belong to The Gioi Di D**g“. An official press release is also available – https://www.thegioididong.com/tin-tuc/the-gioi-di-dong-bi-ro-ri-thong-tin-khach-hang-do-la-tin-gia–1129601

At DFIR VN we decided to download the leak (that had been re-posted elsewhere in a MEGA link) and analyse it to see whether the The Gioi Di D**g claim that the leak is fake could be confirmed independently.

Those data we got from there :

Số hiệu thiết bị (TID): Equipment number – it appears to be the reference for the card machine reading the transaction. It is not a primary – duplicates exist.
Số hiệu đơn vị (MID): Unit number – Merchant IT
Địa chỉ (Tên đơn vị): Address/unit name.
Only 759 distinct (TID,MID, Địa chỉ) tuples exist.
Loại thẻ: Card type (Mastercard, JCB..etc)
Ngày giao dịch: transaction date in a YYYYMMDD format
Giờ giao dịch: transaction time in a HHMMSS format
Ngày xử lý: Processing date in YYYYMMDD
Số thẻ: Card number with the middle 6 digits masked
Mã chuẩn chi: Standard code
Số lô: Lot number
Số tiền giao dịch gốc : Original transaction amount
Phí (chưa VAT): Charge (without VAT)
VAT (của phí): VAT of charge
Tỷ lệ phí (%): Rate of charge
Số tham chiếu: Reference number

Few attackers would waste current (valid) credit cards on Raidforums – as there are many dark web marketplaces where card details could be sold at a profit.

Given the quality of the email lists taken – very likely extracted with a script from a raw email dump- with credential stuffing, with the additional release of this July 2016 report from The Gioi Di D**g’s card payment provider, it is possible that the attackers gained access to one or several email accounts at The Gioi Di D**g (one containing the report as an email attachment). Access to the upstream payment provider would have been a larger issue – unlikely to have been wasted on a Raidforums release.

So far, nothing indicates that the information released originates from confidential back-office systems.

If you are concerned about the security of your personal informations, do not hesitate to contact us

Contact us
www.dfir.vn
Email: [email protected] or [email protected] (Vietnamese)
Address: B15.05 Saigon Royal, 34-35 Bến Vân Đồn, Phường 12, Quận 4, Ho Chi Minh City.

We are a consultancy with over 10 years of experience in the IT security field worldwide,  now providing   and   service...
13/12/2020

We are a consultancy with over 10 years of experience in the IT security field worldwide, now providing and services to organisations in Vietnam.

We also provide Websites, Web applications for all sizes of businesses, from small to large scale.

We are based in Ho Chi Minh City, but assist clients throughout the country.

Our team is ready to lead or assist IT teams in the following tasks:

Evaluating security problems on systems, networks or applications. Recover data, perform internal investigations on computer and other digital media.
Preparing a plan of action in order to contain the problem, remove it and restore functionality.
Design policies, procedures and action plans in order to prevent future problems.

Please visit our's website to know more about us at
https://www.dfir.vn
or
Contact us
Email: [email protected] or [email protected] (Vietnamese)
Address: B15.05 Saigon Royal, 34-35 Bến Vân Đồn, Phường 12, Quận 4, Ho Chi Minh City.

Learn more about:

-
https://www.dfir.vn/digital-forensics/
https://www.dfir.vn/postmortem-analysis/

As part of the our incident response service, we also provide with detailed postmortem analysis of breaches. This analysis not only describes how attackers got in, but how this can be corrected and improved to prevent further attacks in the future.

Address

The Tresor OT1 3. 41, 39 Bến Vân Đồn, Phường 13, Quận 4
Ho Chi Minh City
70000

Opening Hours

Monday 08:00 - 17:00
Tuesday 08:00 - 17:00
Wednesday 08:00 - 17:00
Thursday 08:00 - 17:00
Friday 08:00 - 17:00

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when DFIR-Vietnam posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Business

Send a message to DFIR-Vietnam:

Share

Category