11/08/2026
Yes. I would elevate it from a general climate-justice opinion piece into a politically literate policy op-ed—focused on power, governance, public participation, political accountability, the developmental state, municipal planning, and the political economy of green industrialisation.
South Africa’s Digital Future Is a Political Choice: From Data Centres to Green Industrialisation and a Just Transition
By Motlatsi Makhasane
South Africa’s debate about data-centre expansion is being presented largely as a question of technological progress, investment attraction and digital transformation.
That framing is incomplete.
The expansion of data centres is fundamentally a question of political economy: who controls infrastructure, who benefits from investment, who carries environmental costs, how scarce public resources are allocated, and whether communities have meaningful power over decisions that will shape their future.
The concerns raised by the Climate Justice Coalition about public participation in South Africa’s data-centre expansion should therefore not be dismissed as resistance to development. They should be understood as part of a necessary democratic debate about the direction of South Africa’s development model.
The central question is not whether South Africa should participate in the digital economy.
Of course it should.
The question is:
What political, economic, social and environmental conditions must govern that participation?
Development is never politically neutral
Every major infrastructure decision distributes benefits and costs.
A data centre requires electricity, water, land, roads, telecommunications infrastructure and municipal services. These are not abstract inputs. They are resources over which competing social and economic interests already exist.
South Africa has communities experiencing water insecurity, unreliable municipal infrastructure, unemployment and energy poverty. At the same time, global capital is searching for locations in which to establish increasingly energy-intensive digital infrastructure.
This creates a political question:
Whose development priorities determine how scarce resources are allocated?
If communities are expected to absorb the environmental and infrastructure consequences while the economic benefits are concentrated elsewhere, then the issue is not simply technological development.
It is an issue of distributional justice.
If affected communities are informed only after critical decisions have effectively been made, then the issue is not simply consultation.
It is an issue of democratic power.
From public participation to public power
South Africa's constitutional democracy created an important principle: citizens are not merely recipients of government decisions. They have a role in shaping those decisions.
But public participation must move beyond procedural compliance.
A meeting, notice or consultation process does not automatically constitute meaningful participation.
Political literacy requires communities to understand where decisions are made, who has authority, what information is available, what alternatives exist, and how public input can change an outcome.
This is particularly important for complex infrastructure projects.
A community cannot meaningfully participate in a decision about water demand, electricity capacity, climate risk or cumulative environmental impacts if the technical information is inaccessible or the decision-making process is opaque.
Therefore, the democratic challenge is not simply to create more consultations.
It is to create informed public participation capable of influencing development decisions.
The developmental state must shape investment
South Africa cannot afford a development model in which government merely competes to attract private capital and then treats the arrival of investment as the measure of success.
A developmental state should do something more ambitious.
It should shape markets in accordance with public objectives.
Data-centre investment should therefore be linked to national priorities: industrialisation, localisation, employment, energy transition, water security, technological capability and regional development.
The question should not be:
"How much investment can South Africa attract?"
It should be:
"What developmental outcomes will South Africa secure from that investment?"
This is the difference between being a passive investment destination and being an active developmental state.
Data centres and the politics of green industrialisation
The digital economy presents an opportunity to rethink South Africa's industrial strategy.
Data centres can create demand for renewable energy, battery storage, advanced cooling systems, water-recycling technologies, electrical engineering, construction, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and digital services.
But without deliberate industrial policy, much of this value may remain outside local economies.
South Africa should therefore negotiate investment from a position of strategic interest.
Large digital infrastructure projects should contribute to building domestic capabilities.
This could mean stronger local procurement, skills development, renewable-energy partnerships, water innovation, research and development, enterprise development and support for emerging green industries.
The objective should be to move from:
data-centre investment → resource consumption
towards:
data-centre investment → green industrial ecosystem → local capabilities → decent work → community value.
That is the political meaning of green industrialisation.
The Just Transition cannot stop at coal
South Africa's Just Transition debate has rightly focused on coal-dependent regions, workers and communities.
But the transition must also address the political economy of the emerging economy.
If old industries are being transformed while new industries reproduce patterns of concentrated ownership, resource inequality and limited community participation, then the transition will be incomplete.
The Just Transition must therefore ask:
Who owns the new economy?
Who owns renewable-energy infrastructure?
Who owns the digital infrastructure?
Who benefits from carbon markets?
Who develops the technology?
Who gets the skilled jobs?
Who controls the data?
Who carries the environmental risk?
These are political questions.
A Just Transition is not simply about replacing one technology with another.
It is about changing the relationships of power, ownership and opportunity associated with economic development.
The IDP must become a political instrument for long-term transformation
This is where local government becomes critical.
South Africa's Integrated Development Plan should not be treated merely as a technical municipal planning requirement or an election-period document.
The IDP can become one of the most important democratic instruments for translating national climate, industrial and development priorities into local economic transformation.
Municipalities should use their IDPs to determine what kind of local economy they want to build.
That means asking:
- What industries should the municipality attract?
- What resources can the municipality sustainably provide?
- What climate risks threaten development?
- What infrastructure gaps must be addressed?
- What green industries can create local employment?
- How can young people participate in the new economy?
- How can communities become economic participants rather than passive beneficiaries?
- What conditions should accompany major private investments?
- How will municipal infrastructure and natural resources be protected?
This is particularly important beyond local government elections.
Elections determine political mandates.
They should not determine whether long-term development planning exists.
Political parties may change. Councillors may change. Mayors may change.
But the municipality's long-term development trajectory should remain anchored in an informed, participatory and accountable planning system.
Beyond election politics
Political literacy means understanding that democracy does not end when citizens cast their ballots.
The election is one moment in the democratic process.
The real work continues through IDPs, municipal budgets, public hearings, development applications, procurement, implementation, monitoring and community oversight.
Communities should therefore move from being electoral constituencies to becoming development constituencies.
A development constituency understands its municipality's plans, monitors implementation, interrogates budgets, participates in planning and demands accountability from elected representatives and public institutions.
This changes the relationship between citizens and government.
Instead of asking politicians only:
"What will you do for us?"
communities can ask:
"What commitments will you put into the IDP, budget and performance framework—and how will we measure delivery?"
That is a much deeper form of democratic participation.
A new political compact for infrastructure
South Africa needs a new compact between the state, communities and capital.
Investors need certainty.
Government needs investment.
Communities need development.
Workers need decent employment.
Young people need opportunities.
And ecosystems need protection.
These interests can be reconciled, but not through deregulated competition for investment.
They require negotiated development under democratic conditions.
Large infrastructure investments should therefore be assessed not only for their financial feasibility but also for their contribution to national and local developmental objectives.
A data centre, mine, renewable-energy project, industrial facility or logistics hub should be viewed as part of a wider territorial economy.
The question becomes:
What does this investment do for the place in which it operates?
Does it strengthen local infrastructure?
Does it develop skills?
Does it create enterprises?
Does it contribute to municipal revenues?
Does it support climate resilience?
Does it reduce pressure on water resources?
Does it contribute to a low-carbon economy?
Does it create pathways for community ownership?
Does it strengthen rather than weaken democratic accountability?
These should become political and policy questions—not afterthoughts.
South Africa needs a Just Digital Transition
The next phase of South Africa's development requires us to connect three agendas that are too often treated separately:
Digital transformation.
Green industrialisation.
The Just Transition.
Together, they provide an opportunity to build an economy that is technologically advanced while also being socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable.
But this will not happen automatically.
Markets will not automatically deliver justice.
Investment will not automatically deliver inclusion.
Technology will not automatically deliver democracy.
These outcomes require political choices, public institutions, organised communities and accountable governance.
That is why the data-centre debate matters.
It is not merely about buildings filled with computers.
It is about the kind of political economy South Africa is constructing for the next generation.
We should not simply ask whether South Africa can become a digital economy.
We should ask whether South Africa can become a democratic, green, inclusive and sovereign digital economy.
And that requires us to move beyond the politics of election promises towards the politics of long-term developmental accountability.
The IDP can be one of the instruments through which that transformation is made real.
The challenge is to ensure that communities are not merely consulted about the future.
They must have a meaningful role in shaping it.
South Africa's digital future should therefore not be designed solely by investors, technology companies or government departments.
It should be shaped through democratic institutions, informed communities, developmental policy and a Just Transition framework capable of connecting climate justice with economic transformation.
The question is no longer whether South Africa will transform.
The question is who will shape the transformation—and in whose interests.
